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We consider a two-way quantum cryptographic protocol with coherent states assuming direct reconciliation.
A detailed security analysis is performed considering a two-mode coherent attack, which represents the residual
eavesdropping once the parties have reduced the general attack by applying symmetric random permutations.
In this context we provide a general analytical expression for the key rate, discussing the impact of the residual
two-mode correlations on the security of the scheme. In particular, we identify the optimal eavesdropping against
two-way quantum communication, which is given by a two-mode coherent attack with symmetric and separable
correlations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] is to make
available unconditionally secure private keys between two
authenticated users, Alice and Bob. Carriers of the information
are quantum systems whose quantum nature is exploited
to generate the same random sequence of bits, then to be
used as a cryptographic key in one-time pad protocols. This
strategy is based on the fundamental restriction, imposed by
quantum mechanics, that obtaining perfect copies of arbitrary
quantum states is impossible. In fact, any attempt in this sense
unavoidably introduces some noise perturbing the quantum
state itself (no-cloning theorem [2]).
To convert this feature of the quantum world into the
ultimate cipher [3], any quantum cryptographic protocol needs
to be arranged in a first quantum communication step, followed
by a classical communication one. During the first stage, Alice
encodes classical information into nonorthogonal quantum
states, which are sent to Bob over a noisy quantum channel.
This is used N times and assumed to be in the hands of an
eavesdropper (Eve). The quantum signals are measured by
Bob, detecting a noisy version of Alice’s quantum states. After
many uses of the channel (N  1), the parties can share a
random sequence of bits called the raw key. At this point,
the parties sacrifice part of the N bits, from the raw key,
communicating over a classical public channel. This allows
them to compare the data in their hands and to estimate the
presence of the eavesdropper on the quantum channel. This
second stage allows Alice and Bob to quantify the adequate
amount of error correction and privacy amplifications needed
to reduce the stolen information to a negligible amount [4].
In recent years, continuous variable (CV) quantum sys-
tems [5,6] have attracted increasing attention for the im-
plementation of quantum communication tasks, with special
attention devoted to Gaussian CV states. The appealing possi-
bilities of this approach are based on the replacement of single-
photon pulses with bright coherent states and single-photon
detection with simpler and more efficient Gaussian operations
like homodyne and/or heterodyne detection schemes. This
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simplifies the experimental realization, on one hand, and can
increase the key-rate production of the protocols by many
orders of magnitude, on the other [1,7–10]. Furthermore,
Gaussian CV protocols can easily go broadband. Within this
research area, quantum cryptography has been one of the most
prolific fields in recent years [6], with extensive theoretical and
experimental research developed to improve the performances
of point-to-point communications in one-way [11,12] and
two-way [13,14] protocols.
In two-way schemes the parties exploit twice the quantum
channel per each use of the protocol [13,14] (see also
Ref. [15] for Discrete Variable (DV) two-way protocols and
Refs. [16–18] for CV two-way protocols based on quantum
illuminations [19–21]). In particular, CV two-way proto-
cols [13,14] can achieve higher security thresholds thanks to
an improved tolerance to the eavesdropper’s noise. In fact,
the analysis developed in Ref. [13] (see, for example, Fig. 3
in Ref. [13]) proved that, for fixed values of the channel’s
transmissivity, CV two-way protocols tolerate a higher level
of noise than one-way protocols in the case of collective
attacks. This makes this approach appealing to achieve high-
rate secure communication in noisier environments, where
one-way communication fails to provide a secure key.
In this work we study the security of two-way QKD
considering general coherent attacks and focusing on direct
reconciliation. In this case (see Fig. 1) Gaussian-modulated
reference coherent states, |β〉, are sent from Bob to Alice
through the quantum channel and are processed by Alice
via a random displacement operation, D(α), with Gaussian
modulation of amplitudes α. The output ρ(α,β) is sent back-
ward to Bob, who applies heterodyne detection and classical
postprocessing, in order to subtract the reference amplitude β
and infer Alice’s signal amplitude α. The higher tolerance to
noise, granted by the double-use of the quantum channel, is
due to the fact that Eve needs to attack both the forward and
the backward steps of the quantum communication, in order
to extract information on both β and α [13].
The key rate of the two-way QKD protocol has been
studied under the standard assumption of collective Gaussian
attacks [6]. Protection against coherent attacks can be achieved
by switching randomly between single and double-use of the
quantum channel (on-off switching) [13]. Collective attacks
mean that Eve attaches uncorrelated ancillary modes to each
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FIG. 1. In the general two-way protocol Bob sends the reference
state ρ(β) to Alice, who applies a random displacement D(α). The
resulting Gaussian state ρ(α + β) is sent back to Bob, who applies
heterodyne detection and classical postprocessing to recover Alice’s
encoding (α).
use of the quantum channel. The ancillae interact unitarily
with the communication modes and are then measured by the
eavesdropper. In this scenario, recently, it has been possible to
extend two-way QKD also to the case where the parties encode
information affected by trusted thermal noise [14].
In the present study we explicitly derive the secret key of
the two-way protocol in the case where Eve’s ancillary states
are correlated. Inthis case the Alice-Bob communication line
becomes a memory channel [22,23], in contrast to the case
of collective attacks, where it is memoryless. Here we report
a security analysis of a two-way CV-QKD protocol against
coherent attacks. Our analysis is based on the conventional
assumption that the parties exchange a large number of signals
(N  1). In this case we can reduce the general attack to a
simpler two-mode coherent attack where, for each use of the
protocol, Eve’s ancillae share nonzero two-mode correlations.
In addition to this, we consider the case of asymptotically large
Gaussian modulation of the amplitudes α and β. This allows us
to work with analytical mathematical expressions and to find
the optimal two-mode coherent attack against the protocol,
when Eve injects symmetric separable correlations [22].
The results for the two-way protocol are compared with
the performances of the one-way version of the scheme and
show that eavesdropping two-way quantum communication
with a suitable two-mode coherent attack can reduce the
performances partly below the one-way security threshold.
This represents an example of a coherent attack overcoming the
performances of collective ones, in point-to-point protocols.
We discuss why this happens, in the context considered here,
and finally, we compare our results with those of other recent
studies [7,8,24] where two-mode optimal coherent attacks
have been identified for end-to-end cryptographic protocols.
Our results are important for the development of the security
analysis of CV protocols and for identification of the general
challenges to implementing secure point-to-point communi-
cations. Our results confirm that the on-off switching operated
by Alice, described in detail in Refs. [13] and [24], represents
a necessary countermeasure to overcome the problem of
realistic coherent attacks in two-way point-to-point quantum
cryptography.
FIG. 2. Entanglement-based representation of the two-way QKD
protocol. Bob prepares reference coherent states |β〉. This can be done
by heterodyning one part of an EPR state. One mode is measured (B1),
while the other, B ′1, is sent to Alice through an insecure quantum
channel. Alice applies a random displacement of the reference
state, D(α), which can be implemented by a beam splitter with
transmissivity η and another EPR state. Choosing appropriately the
transmissivity η and the variance of her EPR state, Alice sends
displaced output state ρ(α,β) back to Bob. These are heterodyned
and classically postprocessed by Bob. In this way he recovers Alice’s
encoding by subtracting the known reference amplitude β. The
information encoded in the amplitude α is then used to obtain the
raw key.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sec. II we
introduce the protocol and illustrate the reduction of the
general eavesdropping to a two-mode coherent attack. In
Sec. III we provide the definition of the key rate and we
show how to compute the Holevo bound and Alice-Bob mutual
information, arriving at the analytical expression of the secret-
key rate. In Sec. IV we analyze the security thresholds and we
study the behavior of the relevant quantities as a function
of Eve’s injected thermal noise and degree of two-mode
correlation. Section V presents our conclusions.
II. PROTOCOL AND EAVESDROPPING
We show the protocol in the entanglement-based rep-
resentation (see Fig. 2). We reduce the general coherent
eavesdropping to two-mode coherent attacks, and we illustrate
the steps to compute the total and conditional covariance
matrices. Then in the next section we provide the analytical
expression of the symplectic spectra, which are used to
compute the Holevo bound.
A. Coherent Gaussian attack
In a general (coherent) eavesdropping, Eve processes all N
uses of the quantum channel applying a global coherent unitary
operation that correlates all the modes involved in the different
uses. However, exploiting the quantum de Finetti theorem [25]
for infinite-dimensional systems, this general scenario can be
reduced to a two-mode coherent attack. The parties can apply
symmetric random permutations of the classical data in such
a way that for N  1, the cross correlations between distinct
uses of the two-way communication can be neglected. The
global coherence of the attack is thus reduced to a two-mode
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coherence, between the forward and the backward channels
involved in each round-trip quantum communication.
This residual two-mode coherent attack, in the most typical
case, is implemented by two beam splitters of transmissivity
T [26], where Eve mixes two ancillary modes, E1 and E2 (see
Fig. 2). These two ancillae belong to a generally larger set
of modes, {E1, E2,e}, defining the pure initial quantum state
owned by the eavesdropper. The two-mode Gaussian state
ρE1E2 is generally correlated and described by the following
covariance matrix (CM):
VE1E2 =
(
ωI G
G ωI
)
, G :=
(
g 0
0 g′
)
. (1)
Here the parameter ω describes the variance of the thermal
noise injected by Eve in the beam splitters, I = diag(1,1), Z =
diag(1, − 1), and matrix G accounts for the specific two-mode
correlations employed by Eve to eavesdrop. The parameters
ω, g, and g′ must fulfill the conditions given in Ref. [22], in
order to represent a physical attack. Note that the properties of
this type of non-Markovian channel have recently been studied
in the context of relay-based CV quantum cryptography [7,8],
where they have also been classified and grouped into three
possible cases. More recently it has been shown how they
could be exploited to reactivate entanglement distribution and
quantum communication protocols [27].
We distinguish three possible extremal cases: collective at-
tacks, for g = g′ = 0, corresponding to the standard collective
eavesdropping; separable attacks, defined by the condition
|g| = |g′| = ω − 1, representing coherent attacks with separa-
ble correlations injected; and finally, Einstein-Podolski-Rosen
(EPR) attacks, where g = −g′ = √ω2 − 1 and g = −g′ =
−√ω2 − 1. These three eavesdropping strategies are not
equivalent, and in the next section we identify the optimal
one.
B. Entanglement-based protocol
We perform the security analysis in the entanglement-based
representation so that, besides previous dilation of the quantum
channel, we also provide the purification of the source of Bob’s
coherent states and Alice’s random displacements. Thus, by
referring to Fig. 2, we first assume that Bob’s coherent states
originate from two-mode squeezed vacuum states (EPR states),
which are zero-mean Gaussian state, is described by the CM
VB1B ′1 =
⎛
⎝ μBI
√
μ2B − 1Z√
μ2B − 1Z μBI
⎞
⎠, (2)
where the variance parameter μB quantifies the entanglement
and also the local thermal noise in modes B1 and B ′1. The
heterodyne measurement performed by Bob on mode B1
remotely projects mode B ′1 on a coherent state traveling
forward (from Bob to Alice) through the quantum channel. Its
amplitude is classically modulated with a Gaussian distribution
having variance μ = μB − 1.
At Alice’s station the random displacement D(α) can be
implemented by means of a beam splitter of transmissivity η.
This mixes the incoming mode C1 with a mode A′, coming
from Alice’s EPR pairs A and A′, whose Gaussian quantum
state, ρAA′ , is described by the following CM:
VAA′ =
⎛
⎝ μAI
√
μ2A − 1Z√
μ2A − 1Z μAI
⎞
⎠. (3)
While Alice’s mode A′ is sent through the beam splitter, the
other mode A is heterodyne detected, in order to project the
mode A′ onto a coherent state |γ 〉 modulated with variance μγ
such that
μγ = μA − 1. (4)
This setup is a way to equivalently simulate Alice’s random
displacements. In fact, for simplicity, consider the case where
Eve is absent and there is no loss or noise in the quantum
channel. In this scenario Alice receives |β〉 and must send
|β + α〉 = D(α)|β〉 back to Bob. We can see that, using the
setup with the beam splitter, Alice prepares her output mode
C2 in the coherent state
|√ηβ +
√
1 − ηγ 〉. (5)
Now, in order to obtain a coherent state of the form |β + α〉
from Eq. (5), we design Alice’s beam splitter to have trans-
missivity η → 1, and we assume that the coherent amplitude
γ → ∞ in such a way that
γ = α√
1 − η .
This is possible in theory by using an EPR input state for Alice
with divergent variance μγ + 1, where
μγ := μ1 − η . (6)
Under these assumptions we get
|√ηβ +
√
1 − ηγ 〉  |β + α〉.
III. KEY RATE, HOLEVO FUNCTION, AND
MUTUAL INFORMATION
In direct reconciliation the parties use Alice’s amplitudes
α to prepare the secret key. This means that, during the
classical procedure of parameter estimation, error correction,
and privacy amplification, Bob infers the values of Alice’s
variables α from the results of his measurements. The security
performances are quantified by the asymptotic secret-key rate
R := IAB − χEA, (7)
which is defined as the difference between Alice-Bob’s mutual
information IAB and the Holevo function χEA, which upper
bounds Eve-Alice’s mutual information.
The advantage of using the entanglement-based representa-
tion in Sec. II B relies on the fact that we do not need to know
the details of the coherent operations performed by Eve on the
modes. Instead, we can compute the function χEA from the
output quantum state of Alice and Bob [6]. More precisely, we
compute Eve’s Holevo information as
χEA = SE − SE|α, (8)
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where SE is the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s total output
modes, which coincides with the von Neumann entropy of
Alice’s and Bob’s total output modes B1, A, A′′, and B2. The
other quantity is the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s output
modes conditioned on Alice’s detection α. This is equal to
the von Neumann entropy of Bob’s output modes B1 and B2
conditioned on α.
For Gaussian states, the von Neumann entropy has a partic-
ularly simple form in terms of the symplectic eigenvalues [6].
It is given by
S :=
∑
ν
h(ν), (9)
where ν are the symplectic eigenvalues of the CM associated
with the state, and the entropic function h(ν) is defined as
h(ν) := ν + 1
2
log2
ν + 1
2
− ν − 1
2
log2
ν − 1
2
.
This expression simplifies further in the limit of large modu-
lation μ  1, in which case we have
h(ν) → log2
e
2
ν + O(ν−1). (10)
In the next subsection we provide the total and conditional
CMs corresponding to ρB1AA′′B2 and ρB1B2|α and the respective
symplectic spectra, which are then used to compute the Holevo
bound χEA.
A. Total symplectic spectrum
The global Alice-Bob quantum state, ρB1AA′′B2 , is a Gaus-
sian state whose properties are described by the CM (we use
the modes ordering B1AA′′B2)
V =
⎛
⎜⎝
μBI φZ θZ
μAI ξZ τZ
φZ ξZ kI δI
θZ τZ δI εI
⎞
⎟⎠+
⎛
⎜⎝
gδG
gδG gεG
⎞
⎟⎠, (11)
where the missing matrix entries are 0 and we have defined
φ := −
√
T (1 − η)(μ2B − 1),
θ := T
√
η
(
μ2B − 1
)
,
k := ημA + (1 − η)[T μB + (1 − T )ω],
ξ :=
√
η
(
μ2A − 1
)
,
τ :=
√
T (1 − η)(μ2A − 1), (12)
ε := T 2ημB + T (1 − η)μA + (T η + 1)(1 − T )ω,
gε := 2(1 − T )
√
ηT ,
δ :=
√
T η(1 − η)[μA − T μB − (1 − T )ω],
gδ := −(1 − T )
√
(1 − η).
To obtain the symplectic spectrum of the CM of Eq. (11),
we first compute the matrix
MT = iV, (13)
where  =⊕4k=1 ω˜k , with ω˜k = ( 0 1−1 0) the symplectic form.
Then we compute the standard eigenvalues of Eq. (13).
After performing simple algebra and taking the limit of large
modulation (μ  1), we find the general expressions
ν1 =
√
(ω − g)(ω − g′), (14)
ν2 =
√
(ω + g)(ω + g′), (15)
ν3ν4 = (1 − T )2μ2, (16)
where the dependency on the correlation parameter, g and
g′, generalizes the known total symplectic spectrum under
collective attacks [13], recovered for g = g′ = 0. Using this
spectrum with Eqs. (9) and (10), one easily obtains the
asymptotic total von Neumann entropy, which we can write as
SE = h(ν1) + h(ν2) + log2
e2
4
(1 − T )2μ2. (17)
B. Conditional symplectic spectrum and Holevo bound
When the protocol is used in direct reconciliation Bob’s
conditional CM can be obtained straightforwardly considering
the CM involving Bob’s modes, obtained from Eq. (11) tracing
out Alice’s modes. This approach considerably simplifies the
problem. Starting from the matrix
VB1B2 =
(
μBI θZ
θZ εI + gεG
)
, (18)
we set μA = 1 to simulate the conditioning on Alice’s
measurements, to arrive at the conditional CM given by
VC = VB1B2 (μA = 1). (19)
From this CM we compute the matrix
MC = iVC, (20)
where  =⊕2k=1 ω˜k , and we derive its spectrum. Considering
the asymptotic limit for large μ and the limit η → 1, we obtain
the following pair of symplectic eigenvalues:
ν¯1 =
√
ω + 2g
√
T
1 + T
√
ω + 2g′
√
T
1 + T , (21)
ν¯2 = (1 − T 2)μ.
Using ν¯1 and ν¯2 in Eq. (9) and (10), we derive the conditional
von Neumann entropy:
SE|α = h(ν¯1) + h(ν¯2),
= h(ν¯1) + log2
e
2
(1 − T 2)μ. (22)
Finally, putting together the results of Eqs. (17) and (22) in the
definition of the Holevo function, Eq. (8), we find the analytic
expression of the Holevo bound:
χEA = h(ν1) + h(ν2) − h(ν¯1) + log2
e
2
1 − T
1 + T μ. (23)
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C. Mutual information
To obtain the secret-key rate we also need Alice-Bob mutual
information. Since both quadratures, q and p, of mode B2
are measured, the mutual information IAB is given by the
expression
IAB = 12 log2
V
q
B + 1
V
q
B|αβ + 1
+ 1
2
log2
V
p
B + 1
V
p
B|αβ + 1
,
where V qB and V
p
B represent the variances for quadratures q and
p of mode B2, while V qB|αβ and V
p
B|αβ describe the conditional
variances after Bob and Alice’s measurements. The former
can be obtained from the diagonal block of the CM given in
Eq. (18), describing mode B2. This is given by the expression
B2 = εI + gεG, (24)
from which, taking the limit η → 1 and setting μB = 1, we
obtain
V
q
B = T 2 + T μ + (1 − T 2)ω + 2g(1 − T )
√
T ,
V
p
B = T 2 + T μ + (1 − T 2)ω + 2g′(1 − T )
√
T .
The conditional variances, V qB|αβ and V
p
B|αβ , can now be
obtained setting μ = 0 in the previous equations. Taking the
limit of large modulation μ  1, we get the asymptotic Alice-
Bob mutual information
IAB = 12 log2
T 2μ2
σσ ′
, (25)
where
σ := V qB|αβ + 1 =  + 2g(1 − T )
√
T ,
σ ′ := V pB|αβ + 1 =  + 2g′(1 − T )
√
T ,
and
 := 1 + T 2 + (1 − T 2)ω.
D. Secret-key rate
We now have all the quantities needed to compute the
secret-key rate defined in Eq. (7). From the expressions for
the asymptotic mutual information given in Eq. (25) and the
Holevo bound of Eq. (23), after some simple algebra we get
the formula for the key rate
R = log2
2T (1 + T )
e(1 − T )√σσ ′ − h(ν1) − h(ν2) + h(ν¯1), (26)
where ν1 and ν2 are given in Eqs. (14) and (15) and ν¯1 is given
in Eq. (21).
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTACKS
Here we study the security thresholds R = 0 that describe
the performances of the considered protocol for all possible
attacks. The thresholds are given in terms of the tolerable
excess noise, defined as N := [T − 1 + ω(1 − T )]/T , as a
function of the channel transmissivity T .
Figure 3 shows the two-way security thresholds in direct
reconciliation. In particular, the (red) lines labeled (a) and (c)
describe the thresholds of the two-way protocol obtained when
the correlation parameters of the attack fulfill the condition
FIG. 3. (Color online) Security thresholds for the case of the
two-way protocol, in direct reconciliation, against two-mode coherent
attacks. Excess noise [in vacuum shot noise units (SNU)] is
represented on the ordinate, and transmittivity is represented on the
abscissa. Curves (a) and (c) describe two-mode attacks for which
g = −g′. In particular, (a) is the threshold obtained when Eve uses
maximally entangled ancillas E1 and E2. This case is given by
the two equivalent conditions on the correlation parameter, g =√
ω2 − 1 = − g′ and g = −√ω2 − 1 = − g′. Curve (c) describes
the cases g = ω − 1 = − g′ and g = 1 − ω = − g′. Curves (b) and
(d) correspond to the thresholds for g = g′. For curve (b) we have
g = ω − 1 = g′ and g = 1 − ω = g′ (d). The dashed line is the
threshold for standard collective attacks, g = g′ = 0. The dotted
black line is the security threshold for the corresponding one-way
protocol, for which only collective attacks can be considered. We
see that curve (d) partly goes below the one-way threshold for high
transmissivities.
g = −g′. In this case curve (a) describes the security threshold
for maximally entangled ancillary modes E1 and E2. This
situation is described by two distinct (although equivalent)
setups of the coherent attack, for which |g| = √ω2 − 1 =
−|g′|. Curve (c), obtained when |g| = ω − 1 = −|g′|, gives
the extremal case of separable and maximally correlated
ancillae. Black lines are the security thresholds when Eve
exploits a correlation of the type g = g′. In this group of
attacks, modes E1 and E2 can only share separable correlation,
and for g = ω − 1 = g′ we have curve (b), while for g =
1 − ω = g′ we get curve (d). Finally, the dashed line provides
the two-way threshold, under standard collective attacks, i.e.,
when g = g′ = 0.
All these cases have been compared with the security
threshold of the one-way protocol [31], in direct reconciliation
(dotted line), for which the collective attacks are known
to be optimal. We see that for standard collective attacks,
the two-way protocol (dashed line) always overcome the
performances of the one-way protocol (dotted line). However,
if Eve exploits suitably correlated ancillae, she can perform a
more profitable eavesdropping of the two-way protocol. This
is evident from curve (d), which is clearly below the security
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threshold corresponding to collective attacks (dashed line), and
for high transmissivity (T  0.86), it goes below the security
threshold for the one-way protocol (dotted line). Thus for the
two-way protocol described in this paper, we find that the
two-mode coherent attack, given by curve (d), is optimal. In
the Appendix we deepen the discussion of this result.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the two-way QKD protocol, focusing
on its security under two-mode coherent attacks. In the
communication scheme studied here a coherent attack can
be explicitly considered and analytically solved. The analysis
spotlights the evidence of a coherent attack beating the
collective one in the setting of point-to-point protocols.
A similar result has been obtained in previous investigations
focused on the alternative approach to quantum cryptography,
based on the end-to-end paradigm. As proved in Refs. [7]
and [8] when the parties establish the key exploiting two chan-
nels with an untrusted middle relay, then Eve can potentially
obtain an advantage by exploiting correlated ancillary modes.
Here something similar happens, although the optimal attack
is different [28].
Finally, our analysis confirms the importance of the on-
off switching strategy, in the context of two-way QKD
protocols [13]. In light of the results presented, we conclude
that the active exploitation of the additional degrees of
freedom available to the parties in two-way communication
represents a necessary solution to avoid the possibility of
powerful coherent attacks. Alice can decide to open or close
the two-way quantum communication, therefore switching
between one-way and two-way instances; finally, Alice and
Bob decide which instances to keep on the base of Eve’s
strategy. In this sense the on-off switching can grant the
immunity of two-way protocols against coherent attacks.
Further work [24] will extend these results, here restricted
to direct reconciliation, and will consider finite-size effects
and composable security [29,30].
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors acknowledge the financial support provided
by Leverhulme Trust and the EPSRC via qDATA (Grant No.
EP/L011298/1) and the UK Quantum Communications HUB
(Grant No. EP/M013472/1).
APPENDIX: OPTIMAL ATTACK
The result in Fig. 3 shows that, differently from the one-way
protocol, the use of correlated ancillae is convenient for the
eavesdropper. To investigate this feature further we study the
behavior of the quantities defining the key rate of Eq. (26)
as a function of the thermal noise ω. We fix the classical
Gaussian modulation μ = 106, for which we have verified that
the asymptotic limit is largely fulfilled, and the transmissivity
to the value T = 0.65. In the left panel in Fig. 4, we plot the
mutual information IAB , given in Eq. (25), and in the right
panel we plot the Holevo function χEA given by Eq. (23).
First, as one would expect, we note that the mutual
information (Fig. 4, left panel) decreases with increasing
thermal noise. Simultaneously, Eve’s accessible information,
χEA (right panel), corresponding to the optimal two-mode
attack,(d), is the highest among the other cases, (a)–(c). It also
rapidly increases for increasing ω. This attack is profitable for
Eve because she is able to increase her knowledge of Alice’s
variable, α, at a higher rate than Bob can. To illustrate this
property further we have plotted in Fig. 5 the relative variation
of Alice-Bob mutual information,
IAB = (IAB − Ic)/Ic, (A1)
and of the Holevo function,
χEA = (χEA − χc)/χc, (A2)
FIG. 4. (Color online) The behavior of the asymptotic mutual information IAB (left) and of the Holevo function χEA (right) as a function
of Eve’s thermal noise ω. We fix the Gaussian modulation, μ = 106, value for which we checked that the asymptotic limit is achieved. We
also fix the transmissivity T = 0.65, for which the parties may obtain a positive key rate [see curves (a) and (b) in Fig. 3]. The labeling
corresponds to that adopted for the thresholds in Fig. 3. We have that curve (a) describes two-mode attacks for which g = √ω2 − 1 = − g′
or g = −√ω2 − 1 = −g′ and curve (c) describes the case g = ω − 1 = − g′ or g = 1 − ω = − g′. Curve (b) corresponds to the case
g = ω − 1 = g′, and (d) to the case g = 1 − ω = g′, i.e., the optimal attack. The dashed line refers to standard collective attacks, g = g′ = 0.
We see that, for the optimal attack (d), while the mutual information slightly decreases with increasing ω, the curve corresponding to the Holevo
bound, χEA, increases and at a higher rate than in any other attack. This causes the reduction in the key rate in case (d).
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The relative variation of the Holevo bound χEA given in Eq. (A2), and of the mutual information IEA from
Eq. (A1), for the optimal attack (d), versus ω for fixed values of the transmissivity, T = 0.65 (left) and T = 0.95 (right).
of the optimal attack with respect to the respective ex-
pressions under collective attacks (g = g′ = 0), given by
Ic and χc. In the left panel we plot the case for T =
0.65, while the right panel shows the case for T = 0.95.
We note that with increasing transmissivity T , the relative
variation in the mutual information tends to 0, while the
relative variation in Eve’s Holevo information tends to
increase.
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